

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 02553 01 OF 02 251421Z

46

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 INRE-00

ERDE-00 /026 W

----- 035666

O 251313Z FEB 75

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7540

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 MOSCOW 2553

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS: PARM, US, UR

SUBJECT: TTBT/PNE NEGOTIATIONS - PLENARY SEVEN

TTBT/PPNE MESSAGE NUMBER TWENTY

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF DR. BUCHHEIM'S STATEMENT DELIVERED  
AT FEBRUARY 25, 1975 PLENARY:

BEGIN TEXT: THANK YOU MR. TIMERBAEV. I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE  
USEFUL TO CONFIRM OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE AGREEMENT REACHED BY  
AMBASSADOR STOESSEL AND MINISTER MOROKHOV REGARDING THE  
NATURE OF OUR WORK THIS WEEK. AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, THE  
DELEGATIONS WILL ENGAGE IN INFORMAL AND ACTIVE WORKING-  
LEVEL DISCUSSIONS DESIGNED TO CLARIFY THE ISSUES BEFORE  
US WITHOUT INTENDING THAT STATEMENTS WILL BE BINDING UPON  
OUR AUTHORITIES. WE VIEW THIS AS A VALUABLE OPPORTUNITY  
FOR A MORE OR LESS TECHNICAL DISCUSSION AT THE TABLE AND  
PERHAPS IN SMALLER GROUPS AS WELL IF THAT SEEMS APPROPRIATE.

I WOULD LIKE TO BEGIN WITH A REPLY TO A GENERAL  
QUESTION THAT WAS ASKED BY MINISTER MOROKHOV AFTER  
AMBASSADOR STOESSEL PRESENTED OUR STATEMENT ON FEBRUARY  
19 CONCERNING EXCAVATION PNEs.

AS WE UNDERSTOOD IT, MINISTER MOROKHOV'S QUESTION  
WAS ESSENTIALLY THIS: HOW DID THE US CONSTRUCT THE FOUR  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 02553 01 OF 02 251421Z

SPECIFIC LIMITATIONS THAT WE PROPOSE ON EXCAVATION PNEs?

HE ASKED, IN PARTICULAR, HOW OUR PROPOSED LIMITATIONS RELATED TO THE YIELD THRESHOLD ESTABLISHED IN THE TREATY OF JULY 1974.

DR. SAFRONOV ALSO ASKED A GENERAL QUESTION ON FEBRUARY 19 WHICH WE INTERPRET AS BEING ESSENTIALLY THE SAME; AND SUBSTANTIALLY THE SAME GENERAL QUESTION WAS ASKED IN VARIOUS WAYS ON FEBRUARY 21.

OUR ANSWER IS THAT LIMITATIONS ARE NECESSARY. A VARIETY OF IMPORTANT FACTORS WERE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN DESIGNING OUR PROPOSED SET OF LIMITATIONS AND THE ASSOCIATED VERIFICATION PROVISIONS. THESE FACTORS INCLUDED THE LIMITATIONS AND PROVISIONS IN THE TREATY OF JULY 1974 AND ALSO THE FOLLOWING:

-- THE POTENTIAL FOR EXCAVATION EXPLOSIONS TO BE USED FOR NUCLEAR WEAPON TEST PURPOSES ALONG WITH THEIR PRIMARY PEACEFUL PURPOSES,

-- THE POTENTIAL FOR EXCAVATION EXPLOSIONS TO BE USED AS THE BASIS FOR DEVELOPMENT OF NEW NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

-- THE POTENTIAL FOR GROUP EXCAVATION EXPLOSIONS TO PROVIDE AN ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH A CONTAINED NUCLEAR WEAPON TEST MIGHT BE CONDUCTED WITHOUT PRODUCING A DISTINGUISHABLE SEISMIC SIGNAL.

-- THE POTENTIAL FOR EXCAVATION EXPLOSIONS TO BE USED FOR NUCLEAR WEAPON EFFECTS TEST PURPOSES ALONG WITH THEIR PRIMARY PEACEFUL PURPOSES.

WE HAVE ASSESSED FACTORS OF THIS KIND IN LIGHT OF NUCLEAR WEAPON TECHNOLOGY IN ORDER TO DETERMINE PRACTICAL LIMITATIONS WHICH WOULD CONSTRAIN THE POTENTIAL OF EXCAVATION PNES TO PRODUCE WEAPON-RELATED BENEFITS TO A DEGREE CONSISTENT WITH THE LIMITATIONS ESTABLISHED IN THE TREATY OF JULY 1974. WE FULLY EXPECT THAT YOU WILL EXAMINE OUR PROPOSAL IN LIGHT OF YOUR OWN ASSESSMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPON TECHNOLOGY AND GIVE US YOUR VIEWS ON  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MOSCOW 02553 01 OF 02 251421Z

THE MERITS OF OUR PROPOSED SPECIFIC LIMITATIONS.

OUR ASSESSMENT IS THAT OUR FOUR PROPOSED LIMITATIONS, TAKEN TOGETHER, WOULD MEET OUR CRITERIA AS TO WEAPON-RELATED BENEFITS IF ADEQUATELY VERIFIED. THEY FORM AN INTEGRATED SET OF CONDITIONS AND THEY SHOULD NOT BE VIEWED AS DERIVED ONE BY ONE FROM THE YIELD THRESHOLD ESTABLISHED IN THRE TREATY OF JULY 1974.

WE HAVE SET OUT OUR SPECIFIC PROPOSALS FOR AGREE-  
MENT TERMS, AND WE LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR VIEWS ON OUR PROPOSED  
FOUR LIMITATIONS.

NOW I WILL ADD A FEW REMARKS OF A MORE SPECIFIC  
NATURE.

ON FEBRUARY 21, DR. IZRAEL ASKED IF OUR PROPOSED  
LIMIT ON FISSION YIELD WAS BASED ON HUMANITARIAN CON-  
SIDERATIONS. WE UNDERSTAND BY THAT QUESTION THAT HE  
WAS ASKING IF OUR PROPOSED FISSION YIELD LIMIT IS BASED  
ON CONSIDERATIONS OF HUMAN HEALTH OR SAFETY. AS  
AMBASSADOR STOESSEL NOTED, OUR PROPOSAL FOR A FISSION  
YIELD LIMIT IS NOT BASED ON HEALTH OR SAFETY CONSIDERA-  
TIONS. IT IS A RESULT OF OUR GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF  
LIMITATIONS WHICH, TAKEN TOGETHER, WOULD CONSTRAIN THE  
POTENTIAL FOR WEAPON TESTS AND WEAPON DEVELOPMENT  
DERIVED FROM EXCAVATION PNES.

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 02553 02 OF 02 251426Z

51  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 INRE-00

ERDE-00 /026 W

----- 035718

O 251313Z FEB 75  
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7541

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 MOSCOW 2553

EXDIS

THE LIMITATION WE PROPOSE ON MINIMUM DEPTH OF BURIAL  
FOR EXCAVATION PNES IS STRONGLY RELATED TO CONSIDERATIONS  
OF THE POTENTIAL FOR WEAPON-EFFECTS TESTING.

THE POTENTIAL FOR CARRYING OUT A CONTAINED EXPLOSION  
NEAR AN EXCAVATION SALVO IS ONE IMPORTANT CONSIDERATION  
THAT HAS CONTRIBUTED TO OUR DETERMINATION OF THE SPECIFIC

LIMIT ON SALVO YIELD.

MINISTER MOROKHOV, ON FEBRUARY 21, ASKED WHETHER OUR PROPOSED LIMIT OF 500 KILOTONS ON THE AGGREGATE YIELD OF GROUP EXPLOSIONS COULD BE APPLIED TO A GROUP OF ONE EXPLOSIVE, THUS ALLOWING A YIELD OF 500 KILOTONS FOR A SINGLE EXPLOSIVE. WE DID NOT HAVE SUCH AN INTERPRETATION IN MIND.

SEVERAL QUESTIONS HAVE BEEN ASKED ABOUT THE POSSIBLE NUMBERS OF OBSERVERS. THE NUMERICAL SIZE OF AN OBSERVER GROUP WOULD VARY WITH THE SCOPE AND PACE OF A PROJECT. BASED ON ITS PRESENT UNDERSTANDING OF THE LIKELY SCOPE AND SCHEDULE OF EXCAVATION PROJECTS, IT IS THE OPINION OF THE US DELEGATION THAT THE MAXIMUM NUMBER WOULD PROBABLY NOT EXCEED APPROXIMATELY 20 PERSONS.

NOW I WOULD LIKE TO PRESENT MR. CURTIS WHO WILL ANSWER SOME OF DR. IZRAEL'S QUESTIONS. END TEXT.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 02553 02 OF 02 251426Z

2. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MR. CURTIS' STATEMENT DELIVERED AT FEBRUARY 25, 1975 PLENARY:

BEGIN TEXT: MR. :#-84-., WE HAVE CONSIDERED DR. IZRAEL'S QUESTIONS OF LAST WEEK CONCERNING RADIATION FIELD MEASUREMENTS AND RADIATION SAFETY AND I WOULD LIKE TO ANSWER THEM.

AS AN INTRODUCTION, I SHOULD EXPLAIN THAT WE BELIEVE THAT THE OBSERVERS OF EITHER SIDE SHOULD HAVE ACCESS TO RADIATION MEASUREMENTS AND DOSE RATE CONTOUR MAPS WHICH WE ASSUME WOULD NORMALLY BE PREPARED BY THE HOST SIDE. WE FURTHER PROPOSE THAT THE OBSERVERS HAVE THE RIGHT TO MAKE SELECTED INDEPENDENT MEASUREMENTS TO CONFIRM THE RADIATION SURVEYS OF THEIR HOST.

FIRST, WE UNDERSTAND THAT DR. IZRAEL ASKED THE DISTANCE TO WHICH WE BELIEVE RADIATION FIELD MEASUREMENTS WOULD BE NEEDED AFTER EXCAVATION PNES.

WE WOULD WANT THE AREA COVERED BY THE OVERALL SURVEY TO INCLUDE THE AREA SURROUNDING THE CRATER, EXTENDING OUT TO A DISTANCE EQUAL TO THE UPWIND EXTENT OF THE BASE SURGE. IN PRACTICE, OBSTACLES OF TERRAIN MIGHT MAKE SOME OF THIS AREA INACCESSIBLE, NECESSITATION ADJUSTMENT, BUT THIS IS THE GENERAL IDEA.

IN HIS SECOND QUESTION, DR. IZRAEL ASKED IF WE WERE INTERESTED IN TOTAL GAMMA RADIATION INTENSITY OF SPECTRAL

MEASUREMENTS. OUR ANSWER IS THAT, AS PART OF THE STRUCTURE OF OUR FULL PROPOSAL FOR VERIFICATION OF PNE EXCAVATION EXPLOSIONS, GAMMA INTENSITY IS THE PARAMETER WHICH WE BELIEVE TO BE IMPORTANT.

HIS THIRD QUESTION CONCERNED THE LOCATION OF THE RADIOACTIVITY WHICH WE BELIEVE SHOULD BE MEASURED. WE ARE ASKING FOR MEASUREMENT OF THE RADIOACTIVITY ON THE GROUND SURFACE. WE ASSUME THAT THE MEASUREMENTS WOULD BE TAKEN IN THE USUAL MANNER.

DR. ISRAEL'S FOURTH QUESTION CONCERNED THE TIMING OF  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MOSCOW 02553 02 OF 02 251426Z

THESE MEASUREMENTS. WE BELIEVE THAT ONE OR TWO AREA SURVEYS WOULD BE NEEDED DURING THE STAY OF THE OBSERVERS, SUPPLEMENTED BY MORE FREQUENT MEASUREMENTS OF REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLE AREAS.

DR. IZRAEL ALSO ASKED A QUESTION AS TO OUR IDEAS CONCERNING RADIATION SAFETY RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE OBSERVERS. BOTH OF OUR NATIONS HAVE RADIATION SAFETY OPERATING GUIDELINES. ACCORDINGLY, WE WOULD NEED TO AGREE ON JOINT OPERATIONAL RADIATION SAFETY GUIDELINES BEFOREHAND.

I BELIEVE THAT NOW WE HAVE RESPONDED TO ALL OF THE QUESTIONS DR. IZRAEL HAS ASKED THUS FAR.

THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN. END TEXT.  
STOESSEL

SECRET

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** Z  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** EXPLORATION, PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS, NEGOTIATIONS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 25 FEB 1975  
**Decaption Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Decaption Note:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** GolinoFR  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1975MOSCOW02553  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** X3  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Film Number:** D750066-0145  
**From:** MOSCOW  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1975/newtext/t19750215/aaaaanft.tel  
**Line Count:** 258  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Office:** ACTION SS  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** EXDIS  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 5  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** EXDIS  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** GolinoFR  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 21 APR 2003  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <21 APR 2003 by GarlanWA>; APPROVED <22 APR 2003 by GolinoFR>  
**Review Markings:**

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
05 JUL 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** TTBT/PNE NEGOTIATIONS - PLENARY SEVEN TTBT/PPNE MESSAGE NUMBER TWENTY  
**TAGS:** PARM, US, UR  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006